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[L. A. No. 21069. In Bank. Jan. 19. 1951.]

MRS. R1 CHARD EARL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SA .
AND COMPANY (8 Corporation), Defendant and
spondent; A. K. BARBEE, Appellant.

-TL: .A.-- No:-21337.1n-SRiiK:-·-;ran~--T9~1951:]
SAKS AND COMPANY . . (aC9fporation),
.. -. A. K. BARBEE, Appellant.
11] Evidence-Limitation to Issues.-In actions between a
chaser of a coat, his intendl'd Ilonee, and the seller, an
to prove that the gift was mnd~ in reliance on certain
BCntations of the donee and that the purchaser rescinded
gift when he learned that those representations were
properly rejected by the court where the only issues
by the pleadings are whether the sale was made to such
chaser, whether he made such gift. and whether the tran8l1e-J
tions were voidable on the ground of fraud becanse of a
agreement between the seller and the donee.
[2] SaIes-8eller's Remedies-Plea.ding-Amendment.-In actioDl
to determine, among other things, ownership of a coat in 'the.
seller's possession as between the purchaser and his u ...,..u ....
donee who had secretly paid .part of the consideration,
<

[1] See 10 Oal.Jur. 797; 20 Am.Jur. 242.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, §I55; [2] Sales, §
[3] Sales, § 351; {4, 13] Contracts, § 195; {5, 9] Gift.!!, § 21;
Gifts, §22; [10] Sales, §l51; [11] Trial, §B33; (12,14,15]
1176 l6).
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Sl'ller was not prejudieed by the purchaser's delay in amending
his answers to allege fraud based on the secret agreement for
surb payment, where the seller knew of the agreement from the
time it was made and failed to disclose it to the purchaser.
[3] Id.-Seller's R:lmedies-Evidence.-In actions to determine,
II1ll0ng other things, ownership of a coat in the seller's possession as between the purchaser and his intended donee who had
secretly paid part of the consideration, the court was not
entitled to disbelieve the purchaser's uncontradicted testimony
that he would not have bought the coat had he known of the
secret consideration, where his belief that the price charged
was tht' full price was a material element in, and inducing
cause of, the purchase and gift.
[4] Contracts-Rescission.-One may justify an asserted rescission
by proving that at the time there was an adequate cause
although it did 110t become known to him until later.
[6] Gifts-Rescission.-A gift can be rescinded if it was induced
by fraud or material misrepresentation, whether of the donee
or a third person, or by mistake as to a basic fact.
[6] Id.-Validity-Fraud.-A donee's failure to reveal material
facts when he knows that the donor is mistaken as to them is
fraudulent nondisclosure.
(7] Id.-Validity-Mistake.-A mistake which entails substantial
frustration of the donor's purpose entitles him to restitution.
18J Id.-Validity-Misdke.-A donor is entitled to restitution if
he was mistaken as to the identity or essential characteristics
of the gift.
[9] Id.-Rescission.-A donor is entitled to rescind a gift which
he believed he purchased entirely out of his own funds but
which, pursuant to a secret agreement between the seller and
the donee, was partially paid for by the donee.
[lOa, lOb] Sales-Fraud-Representations by Seller.-A seller misrepresents with intent to deceive a purchaser, and is guilty
of actual fraud within eiv. Code, § 1572, so as to make the
contract of purchase voidable, where the seller's clerk quotes
a price, expressed by the purchaser as the most he will pay,
and represents it to be the full price, although the seller has
made a secret agreement to accept an additional consideration
from the purchaser's intended donee.
[11] Trial- Findings - When Probative Findings ControL-Although findings of ultimate facts ordinarily caunot be eontrolled by findings of probative facts, a finding that one party
is not guilty of fraud is not controI1ing where it is contrary
[4] See 6 Cal.Jur. 382; 12 Am.Jur. 1027.

[11] See 24 Cal.Jar. 972.

)

603

I

604

)

EARL fl. SAXe" Co.

to all the evidence and is ~awn from fJ.ndings of prc,ba:tillri
facts which establish the contrary.
[12a,12b] Sales-Rescission bl Vendee.-A purchaser of •
is sufficiently injured to justifl rescission of the trIlLWIlact:iorl'~
where the seller represents the article's full price to be
specified on a sales check, but has secretly agreed to -V'-"-',M
an additional consideration from the purchaser's
donee, since the purchaser does not receive an article fully
for by himself as bargained for and is thus prevented
making a completed gift.
[18 J 'Contracts-Rescission.-Pecuniary loss is not a Pnlre(luiI~-~
to rescission of a transaction.
[14] Sales-Rescission bl Vendee.-Any social interest in sta,bil:i'1~
of transactions so as to avert rescission of a contract of
chase is overridden by the interest in not having a seller make
intentional misrepresentations which mislead a would-be donor '
into the belief that he alone is purchasing an article and that '
his intended donee is to receive it as a fully paid gift, where
the purchaser'S motives are uneconomic and the seller is
'
of the effect whiali the misrepresentations may have and
tends that they should have that effect.
[16] Id.-Rescission bl Vendee.-A contract of purchase and
gift dependent thereon are voidable and are properly rescillldll4:1,
although the purchaser asserts his willingness to purchase
article at a price represented to be the full price, where
seller fails to aceept such offer except on condition of retaiJl~~
an additional consideration secretly paid by the pu:rclli&StIr'"
intended donee.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of LosAngeles County. Thomas J. Cunningham, Judge. Reversed.
Action by donee of mink coat against seller for conversion,' '.
in which defendant by cross-complaint interpleaded donor
to determine title and right to possession; and action by seller
against donor for goods sold and delivered. Judgments against
donee on conversion complaint, for donee on cross-complaint,
and for seller in action for goods soJd and delivered, reversed. •
Ohas. L. Nichols, Ivan Miller, William R. Law, B.
McLaughlin & McClean & Petty for Appellant.
Thomas D. Mercola for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Wright, Wright, Green & Wright,Loyd Wright and BerscheJ B. Green for Defendant and Respondent.
SeHAUER, J .-A. K. Barbee 8,ppeals from judgments, in
eonsolidated actions hereinafter described, that respondem '
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and later paid Saks that sum; that Saks is indifferent
the claims of tht' cross-defendants and is willing to
the coat to either cross·defendant as the court may
(but, it is implicit froni Saks' several plfOadings read
only upon condition that it recover from Barbee or from
Earl or from both of them the full price of the coat) ; it
that the cross-defendants be required to "litigate
themselves their claims to said mink coat"; it did not
to relinquish its asserted claim for any part of the full
of approximately $4,900. Mrs. Earl's answer to the
complaint admitted that she paid Saks $916.30 and ~~:KIMi~;1
that at that time title to the coat "was transferred to
is more fully alleged in her complaint." The complaint,
ever, contains no allegations as to transfer of title.
in answer to the cross-complaint admitted that he told
he would pay the price discussed between Saks and
if and only if Saks "would sell and deliver the coat to him
and for [such] price," and alleged that Mrs. Earl's 8Itlreeimellllij
to pay Saks $916.30 was fraudulently concealed from
by Saks and Mrs. Earl; that they represented to him that
full price of the coat was $3,981.25; and that if he had ......,_oTI
of the secret agreement he would not have agreed to
coat. No pleadings joining issues between Barbee and
Earl were filed. Saks also brought a separate action ugitlUl_I\,1
Barbee, alleging that he owed Saks $3,981.25 for
and delivered. Barbee in answer made allegations of
substantially similar to those in his anSwer to Saks'
complaint. The two actions were consolidated for trial.
From what has been stated it appears that Saks, hpl"Anl!ll!
of its duplicitous compact with Mrs. Earl, finds itself in
position: It knowingly and purposefully caused Barbee
believe that it was s~mng him-and him only-a certain
coat for the full price oi $3,981.25. It wants to collect
$3,981.25 from Barbee but it cannot (or will not) deliver
coat to him-fully paid, for $3,981.25 or otl:lerwiE·;e--beiCall18e.l
although it has possession of the coat, it has already collecte<l
$916.30 for the same coat from Mrs. Earl, and she claims
own the coat and refuses to release her claim to it (or
damages for its alleged conversion) as against either Saks
or Barbee. Mrs. Earl further claims the coat as against
Saks and Barbee on the theory of an asserted gift from Barbee-.
But the gift is, necessarily, dependent upon Barbee's having
purchased thC' coat from Saks and that purchase, it is obvious,
was induced by the joint fraud of Mrs. Earl and Sab. SakI
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and Mrs. Earl-both guilty of express fraud-are seeking
the aid of the court to recover that which they are entitled to,
if at all, only because of their fraud.
[1] While, as indicated above, the pleadings do not specifically allege, or suggest the theory of, the origin of Mrs.
Earl's claim of title to the coat, the trial proceeded on the
theory that the issues were whether there was a sale by Salm
to Barbee and a gift by Barbee to Mrs. Earl, and whether
the two transactions were voidable by Bar~e because of the
secret agreement and misrepresentation. Barbee testified that
he would not have bought the coat if he had known that. the
price was more than $4,000. Every element of the transaction and all the circumstances shown appear to support this
position; no evidence is inconsistent with it. At the trial
. Barbee's counsel restated the position which Barbee bad
announced to Saks before the actions were instituted: "we
arc perfectly willing to accept the coat and pay • . . the
price that we agreed to pay for it [$3,981.25] ..• but we
certainly are under the circumstances disclosed here already
in this evidence [the secret agreement] • ; . not willing to
Jet this coat be handed over to this young lady."Coun.sel
for Barbee also offered to prove that the gift was made in
rcliance on Mrs.IEarl's representations that she would "reciprocate his affection and would give up running around
with other men" and that Barbee rescinded the gift when he
learned that those representations were false. The offered
proof on the latter theory was properly rejected, for no such
issue was raised by the pleadings.
The trial court gave judgment against Mrs. Earl on her
complaint for conversion and in favor of Saks on its complaint against Barbee for goods sold and delivered. On Saks'
"Cross-Complaint.in Interpleader" it gave judgment that
Mrs. Earl is the owner and entitled to possession of the coat.
We are satisfied that the judgment in neither action is tenable insofar as it is adverse to the defendant and cross~defend
ant Barbee.
In the action instituted by Mrs. Earl, in which Sake crosscomplained (L. A~ No. 21069), the trial court made detailed
findings of many evidentiary facts, including the above reeounted proposal of the secret agreement and misrepres:mtation
by Mrs. Earl, its acceptance by Saks, and the secret payment
by Mrs. Earl of $916.30 to Saks. There is no specific finding as
to the truth of Barhef'R nnpontrnc1icted testimony that he
would not have bought the coat if lit> had Iwown of the secret
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agreement and the truth as to the matter misrepresent Pit. :
In the action brought by Saks (L. A. No. 21337~ there is thli' ';
conchsionary finding that Saks "sold and delivered" 1111: ~
coat to Barbee "at the agreed price of $3,981.25," but Ule;
integrity of this finding is completely destroyed by Saks' own :
pleadings and by the other findings. In the aetion instituted
by Mrs. Ear] there are conclusionary findings that BarbE'e .'
"made a gift of" the coat to Mrs. Earl; tbat she "is now the,
owner of said mink coat"; and that Saks "was not guilty of'l
any fraudulent conduct." But Saks' admitted conduct, like . .
that of Mrs. Earl, is fraudulent as a matter of law, and Mrs:',
Earl's asserted title to the coat derives directly from her own
fraud and that of Saks which she sllggested.
Amendment of Barbee's Answer"
[2] The allegations as to fraud in each of Barbee's answers were added by amendment when the ease came on for
trial. Saks contends that the trial court abused its discretion
in anowing the amendments (in August, 1948), in view td.'
the fact that Barbee knew of the secret agreement at least
from the time Saks cross-complained (in June, 1947). It i
says, "Had Saksknown at the time that appellant filed his
answer to the cross-complaint in interpleader • • • that., ~
• pellant was going to allege fraud as an affirmative defense,
perhaps more successful efforts could have been made to have
terminated expensive and long drawn out litigation." :Sut
it appears to us that Saks could not have been prejudiced by
Barbee's delay in amending his answers. Saks knew of the
secret agreement and misrepresentation to Barbee from the
time it made them; it knew that neither the making of the.
agreement with Mrs. Earl nOr the active misrepresentation.
to Barbee was disclosed to Barbee by or in the presence of'
its representatives; and its vague statement as to efforts to
terminate the litigation does not show prejudice.
'
BescisBitm of Oift
[3] The trial court was not entitled to disbelieve Barbe~'tj~
uncontradicted testimony (supported by the circumstances
shown and by the undisputed evidence of all parties that he 1
repeatedly insisted he would not pay more than $4,000) that .'1
he would not have bought the coat if he bad known of the·.
secret agreement between Saks and Mrs. Earl. Although
Barbee did not expressly allege or testify that he would not.
have given the coat to Mrs. Earl if he bad known of the secret,
agreement, it is apparent that the ease was tried as if this _
j
". :l

.".~~

. ~

J
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were in issue and that in fact he would not have made the
gift had he known of the secret agreement. Obviously Barbee's belief that the full price of the coat was $3,981.25
underlay and was a material element in, and inducing cause
of, the gift as well as the immediately preceding purchase.
As previously indicated, he could not have made the gift
unless he made the purchase, and it is indisputably established
that the purcbase was induced by the express fraud of both
Mrs. Earl and Saks. The facts that Barbee. at the trial, by
correctly rejected offers of proof, sought to show another
fraudulent representation which also was an inducement to
his making the gift, and that he announced rescission before
he learned of the secret agreement, do not prevent him from
now basing his defense on such secret agreement. [4] "One
may justify an asserted rescission by proving that at the time
there was an adequate cause although it did not become known
to him until later. One cannot waive or acquiesce in a wrong
while ignorant thereof . . . j, (12 Am.Jur. ]027, § 445.)
[5] A gift can be rescinded if it was induced by fraud or
material misrepresentation (whether of the donee or a third
person) or by mistake as to a "basic fact." (Rest., Restitu,
tion, §§ 26, 39 i see Murdock v. Murdock (1920), 49 Cal.App..
775, 783-785 [194 P.762] ·-{fraudoLdonee] ;.l'U:.cOlark's
~I
Estate (1931),233 App!.Div. 487 [253 N.Y.S. 524, 527]:-not;r--'
45 Harv.L.Rev.750, 80 Pa.L.Rev. 747 [innocent misrepresentation of third party] ; Rest., Contracts, § 477, eommenta.)
. ....
[6] "A failure by the donee to reveal material facts when
:
he knows that the donor is mistaken as to them is fraudu'
lent nondisclosure." (Rest., Restitution, § 26, comment e.)
[7] CCA mistake which entails the substantial frustration of
the donor's purpose entitles him to restitution. No more
definite general statement can be made as to what eonstitutes
a basic mistake in the making of a gift. [8] The donor is
entitled to restitution if he was mistaken as to the . . . identity or essential characteristics of the gift. " (Rest., Restitution, § 26, eomment c.)
[9] Since Barbee was not merely mistaken but was actively mi.;lcd as to a material element in the purchase and as
to an essential eharacteristic of the gift-he believed that the
cont was purchased entirely by him so that it could be given
in its entirety as a gut-he was entitled to, as he did, rescind
the gift.

)
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[lOa] It appears from the findings of probative facts
Saks did more than merely fail to disclose its agreement
Mrs. Earl. In the circumstances, implicit in the finding
Barbee ., was informed by Saks and Company's r~t)rPJ~l'n'tA;!~.
'tives that they would sell said mink coat to him for the
of $3,981.25" is a findiLg that Salis actively mUlr(1)reJsented21
that the price had been reduced and that $3,981.25 was
full price. It is completely unreasonable to deny that,
representation by a clerk in a reputable sto~e that an
has a certain price, followed by the clerk's preparation
the customer's signing of a sale!; check showing purchase
the article for that price, amounts to a represt'ntation by the
store that the total price and the entire sales transaction are'
as represented. This misrepresentation, it appears from the,
undisputed evidence, was made by Saks with knowledge that
Barbee insisted on a reduction in price; from this it
that such misrepresentation must have been made with intat
to deceive Barbee and to induce him to buy the coat.
[11) Although" Actual fraud is always a question of fact".,
(Civ. Code, § 1574; see 12 Cal.Jur., Fraud and Deceit, §
and although findings of ultimate fact ordinarily cannot
, " controlled -'by -tindings-:-n1 -probative -racts--{ see-U
-r--=::.-.iI
Trial;§ 205), here the finding that Saks was not
fraud is not controlling, for it was drawn as a 1!onclusion,-1'....,m--i!I
findings of probative facts which not only do not support
but which establish the contrary (see LaMar v. Lalt/ar (1947),
30 Cal.2d 898, 900 [186 P.2d 678], and cases there cited;'
Robinson v. Haquet (1934), 1 Cal.App.2d 533, 541 [36 P.2d '
821]) and it is contrary to Saks' own pleadings, to undisputed
evidence and to all the evidence on the subject.
[lOb) Salts' conduct was within the letter of the Civil',
Code definition of "actual fraud" which makes a contract'
voidable (§ 1572): "any of the following acts, committed by
a party to a contract, or with his connivance, with intent to
deceive another party thereto, or to induce him to enter into
the contract: ,I. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not
true, by one who does not believe it to be true; . . . 5. Any
other act fitted to deceive." Salts' condu!'t is also within
the letter of the Restatement of Contracts definition of fraud
which makes a transaction induced by it voidable (§ 471) :
"misrepresentation known to be such . .. by any person
intending or expecting thereby toeause a mistake by another

Jan. 1951]
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••• in order to induce the latter to enter into ••• a trans·
action.• ,
[12a] Saks relies on California cases which say that •• fraud
which has produced and will produce no injury will not justify a rescisSion." (Spreckels v. GOf'riU (1907), 162 Cal. 383,
388 [92 P. 1011] ; Munson v. P"kbuNl (1920), 183 Cal. 206.
216 [190 P. 808]; Da,.,.ow v. Houlihan (1928),205 Cal. 77l,
774 [272 P. 1049].) It asserts that a person is not injured
by being induced to buy a $5,000 eoat for $4,000. But the
coat was neither sold nor bought for $4,000. Saks was selling
the coat for the full price, and a person other than seller
Saks and buyer Barbee paid a substantial part-approximately one fifth--of the full price. Furthermore, this "no
injury, no rescission" formula is not very helpful, because of
disagreement in the authorities as to what is meant by "injury." In a sense, anyone who is fraudulently induced to
enter into a contract is "injured"; his "interest in making
a free choice and in exercising his own best judgment in making decisions with respect to economic transactions and enterprises has been interfered with." (See McCleary, Damage as
G Requisite fo Bescilriofa for JiUrepre,entation, 86 Mich.L.
Rev. 1,227,245.)
Also relied on by Saks is • definition of "injury" which
has sometimes appeared in some California cases: "It may btconceded that it must be shown that [one who would rescind)
• • • by reason of fraud, suffered an injury of a pecuniary
nature, that is, an injury to his property rights; as distin·
guished from a mere injury to his feelings, but it will be suffi·
cient if the facts alleged show that material injury will neces·
sarily ensue from the fraud, although the amount of pecuniary
loss is not stated." (Spreckels v. Gorrill (1907), ,upra, 152
Cal. 383, 888.) [18] The "concession" or implication that
in every case there must be "pecuniary loss" is incorrect.
(See Hefferan v. Freebair" (1950), 84 Ca1.2d 715, 721 {214
P.2d 386].) And the definition does not take account of the
eases which allow rescission of a transaction induced by an
agent's misrepresentation of his principal's identity, even
though there was no economic reason for the unwillingness to
deal with the principal. (See cases coUeeted in 48 Uarv.L.
Rev. 480, 485; McCleary, supra, p. 246 of 86 Mich.L.Rev.).
The McCleary article, supra, suggests the following classifi·
cation of the cases which have considl'red reRl·iRSion for fraud:
1. The representee can rescind ,,-here hE' obtains the very
thing that he expected but it is wurth leaot:l tha.u he was led
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reasonably to expect. In most cases where rescission is sought:
the representee has received something of less economic valu ';~
than he e:xpected.~,
2. The representee can rescind where he obtains somethini~
substantially different from that which he was led to expect;"
If one is induced to buy a certain lot of land by misrepre:'~,
sentation that it contains a vineyard, he need not keep it'
when he learns that it contains instead an apple orchard; ey-~l.
though the lot of land is the identical lot of land and althougll.~
the orchard may be more valuable than the vineyard which"::;
he expected to get, it is obviously unfair to require him to '
keep what he did not bargain for and did not want. [12b] The '
undisputed evidence describing the present sale would put it, .
in this class. The coat' bargained for between Barbee and,
Saks, within the knowledge and belief of Barbee, as was known
to Saks, was a coat fully paid for by Barbee, which Saks knew
was to be used as a gift, but Saks intended to and did deliver ~
something substantiaBy different; i. e., a coat on which Barbee '
was cbarged only with a down payment and for which his '
intended donee had secretly agreed to pay in a substantial ,~
part. The seller was to receive approximately 25, per c:, 'I,
more for the coat than the buyer was paying and theelem
"
of a complete gift was being d e s t r o y e d . ! ,
3. Where the representee obtains exactly
. that which
. ..he'
expects, although thcre was misrepresentatIon, the socIal in- f3
terest in the stability of transactions mayor may not out-::,
weigh the social,interest in not having one intentionally take"
advantage of another. Saks attempts to describe the present\~
sale so as to put it in this class. It says that Barbee bargained ",~
for and expected to get a certain coat for a cost to binI of not '~
more than $4,000, and this is what he got. [14] In the pres- ''1\
ent situation, however. where the motives of Barbee were .~
clearly noneconomic, the general social interest in stability
of transactions is overridden by the interest in not having ,'ti
a seller make intentional misrepresentations which mislead j
a would·be donor into the erroDp.ous belief that he alone is :?;
purchasing and that his donee is to receive from him a folly
paid for gift, when the seller is fully aware of the effect which
the misrepresentations may have and intends that they should
have that effect. Again, it is important, the element of a complete gift by donor to donee is being destroyed through the
misrepresentation and concealment.
[16] Sflks contends that Barbee has not rescinded, and
cannot resdnd, the sale because he has stated that he was will,

~

1
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ing to carry out the objectively manifested bargain to purchase the coat for $3,981.25. But at no time since Barbee's
announced willingness to stand on the transaction which be
believed he had entered into with Saks, did Saks offer to comply with the transaction and give Barbee what be bargained
for: a coat for which he was paying in full, without Mrs.
Enrl, a stranger to the Saks-Barbee transaction, paying a
portion of the price. Indeed, Saks, at the time of the resris"ion and mentioned otTer by Barbee, was apparently unable
to sell Barbee the coat iu question as a fully paid for coat for
$3,Y81.25 because Mrs. Earl refused to take back the $916.30
which she paid for the coat and which Saks had previously
at·(·epted. Barbee's counsel, at the trial, made clear his position; after the secret agreement, misrepresentation and payment of $916.30 were in evidence he said, "under the circumstances of this case we shouldn't be required to pay Saks and
Company anything . . . rWl hen he [Barbee J learned all t.he
facts he never would have approved that transaction and
your Honor knows it ... [He] would do anything that could
be. done to repudiate that transaction and say it never was "
real transaction." Weare satisfied that the contract ;)f purchase and the gift were voidable and were properly rescinded.
For the reasons above rateddhe ;udgments..are-r.eversed. ____ ~ ____ .
Shenk, J., Carter, J.,and Spence,J., concurred.. . ' .. _. .
TRAYNOR, J.-Barbee received what he bargained for.

(Cf. Hefferan v. Preebairn, 34 Cal.2d 715, 721 [214 P.2d
386] .) The mink coat that he examined and agreed to' pay
$3,981.25 for, was the one he received and gave to Mrs. Earl.
He concedes that the fair value of the coat was $5,000. It
was not unreasonable for the trial court to couclude that,
since the coat Barbee received was actually worth more than
he agreed to pay, he would not have rejected it because Mrs.
Earl arranged to pay the difference. (See Spinksv. Clark,
147 Cal. 439, 444 [82 P. 45]; Spreckels v. GorriU, 152 Cal.
383,388 [92 P. 1011] ; Munson v. Pishburn, 183 Cal. 206, 216
[190 P.· 808]; Darrow v. Houlihan, 205 Cal. 171, 174-775
[272 P. 1049]; McCleary, Damage As Requisite To Rescission
For Misrepresentation, 36 Mich.L.Rev. I, 15,23-24.) It was
under no compulsion to believf> his stateIllent that he would
have rejected it. (Huth v. Katz. 30 Cal.2d 605, 609 [184
P.2d 521]; Tingey v. E. P. Houghton ct Co., 30 Cal.2d 97,

)
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102 [179 P.2d 807]; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457, 'ZV"'~.i.
[126 P.2d 868].)
It was for the trial court to determine whether Barbee
a man of such temperament that he would bave
having Mrs. Earl get along without the fur coat to aec~ep,till«l
hf'r contribution toward its purchase. Be d(!Clared his love"
for her, expressing the sentiment several times that he wanted'
to give her a fur coat. She was "very much in love with the
coat and wanted it badly." It was important to him
the woman he loved p088ess the coat; it was important to
to po88e88 it. Her contribution enabled him to fulfill his wish .
and hers at a price he was willing to pay. Sinee they were
both fur-coat-minded, it is a reasonable inference that he
would not have risked disturbing the relationship between
them by depriving her of the coat because she was willing to
contribute toward its purchase.
Counsel at the trial made it clear that Barbee sought rescission of the sale because Mrs. Earl failed to live up _whia
expectations.· This failure can in no way be attributed to
Saks and Company. Its coat was of sound quality and came up
to Mrs. Earl's expectations. The court properly rejected
Barbee's ofter of proof of his expectations and disappoint·
ment. Not only were they no concern of Saks and CompanY,
but Dois.Clue wall raised in the pleadings regarding his ar·
... Mr. Barbee did entertain real aA'eetionll for thill youg lad)' and
in beBtowing theBe gifts he WJ1lI 118rfef!tly willing to do ao as lone &8 abe
ahowed him due feeling, respeet, and verity . . ."
"[W]e were perfectly willing if the uudl'J'IItanding between th8118
parties was earried out, we were perfectly willing tbat abe should have
the coat ..• "
.. [W]hen Mr. Barbee that very day finds out that the pretenses that
this girl has' been showing him were Dot genuine, they were false and
;just insubstantial as they could be, Mr. Barbee concluded and he did,the witnesB says she never was with him again,-that he.was oAt on the
wrong tangent and that he waan 't going to give a gift of a Icoat or
anything else to a perBon that was treating bim in tbat fashion."
"lb. Barbee had grown very fond of this girl, that he did expreaa
aA'eetion for her and be told her in eA'eet that if she wanted to reeiproeate his aA'ection and would give up running arood with other men
and give them a chance to Bee whether or not they might be able to
mature their affection, he would be Yery pleased to give her suitable
gifts, a token of his esteem and regard. Now that ill aU that I meant
to say. and I think that ill all I did say, and we expect further to attempt
to show your Honor that on the very evening of this gift that Mr. Barbee
became confronted with the reality that the youg lady wasn't telling
bim the truth about things, she walln't keeping appointments and on
the contrary was misleading him about ber plans and intentions and
wht'D tllat realization eame npon him he felt that he wanted to interrupt the giving of the aift."
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rangements with Mrs. Earl. 1 would therefore affirm the
judgments.
Edmonds, J., concurred.
Respondent's (Saks') petition for a rehearing was denied
February 15, 1951.. Edmonds, J.,and 1.'raynor, J., voted
for a rehearing.
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